Resource-Abundance and Economic Growth in the U.S. by Elissaios Papyrakis & Reyer Gerlagh
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 










and Economic Growth in the U.S. 
Elissaios Papyrakis and Reyer Gerlagh 
 






























It is a common assumption that regions within the same country converge to 
approximately the same steady-state income levels. The so-called absolute convergence 
hypothesis focuses on initial income levels to account for the variability in income 
growth among regions. Empirical data seem to support the absolute convergence 
hypothesis for U.S. states, but the data also show that natural resource-abundance is a 
significant negative determinant of growth. We find that natural resource abundance 
decreases investment, schooling, openness, and R&D expenditure and increases 
corruption, and we show that these effects can fully explain the negative effect of natural 
resource abundance on growth. 
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“Do we value this land and are we prepared to protect it, or are we going to desecrate it, diminish 
it, change it forever for a small amount of oil?”                                                                               
Senator Joseph Lieberman speaking for Alaska, International Herald Tribune, March 21 2003. 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
Historic experience across countries provides support to the hypothesis that resource-scarce 
economies often outperform resource-abundant countries in terms of economic growth. A number of 
recent studies has described and analyzed the resource-curse hypothesis (Gylfason 2000, 2001a, Leite 
and Weidmann 1999, Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004, Rodriquez and Sachs 1999, Sachs and Warner 
1995, 1997, 1999a). The conclusion is widely accepted: natural riches tend to frustrate rather than 
promote economic growth. Countries such as Japan, South Korea and Switzerland have experienced 
remarkably high rates of economic growth despite their lack of natural resources. On the contrary, 
countries, such as Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela and the so-called Oil States in the Gulf became 
examples of development failures despite their extensive reserves of natural wealth.
3 
                                                   
3 We notice that there is much confusion about the exact meaning of the concept resource-abundance. The meaning 
may easily differ between sciences, if not even in different areas of economics (for an extensive analysis of the 
confusion regarding precise terminologies of natural resources see Laroui and Van der Zwaan 2002). For natural 
scientists or environmental economists, resource abundance typically refers to the amount of potentially exploitable 
natural resources. For economists that study the Dutch Disease, resource-abundance typically refers to the amount of 
already exploited natural resources and reserves proven to be economically exploitable. The proportion of potential 
resources that, in the end, becomes economically exploitable depends on many economic, political and technological 
factors. To provide an example, Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) show that there is a strong positive correlation 
between economic growth and (potential) resource-wealth (forest cover) for a sample of 23 closed developing 
economies.  Sachs and Warner (1995), in contrast, find a negative strong correlation between economic growth and 
(already exploited) resource-wealth (the share of primary exports in GDP) for their cross-sectional analysis of 95 
countries. To use Patten’s own words (1889), in economics we often “really need new words more than we do new 
thoughts”. In this paper, we focus on the already exploited natural resources.  
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  The negative correlation between economic growth and resource-abundance, albeit a solid fact, 
still is a conceptual puzzle. Many development economists accentuated the role of natural resources 
in economic development (e.g., Nurkse 1953, Rostow 1960 and Watkins 1963). Indeed, there is no 
obvious reason why natural resources should frustrate economic growth per se. Plentiful fertile land, 
rich fishing banks, diamond mines and vast oil reserves should drive economic growth rather than 
restrain it. As Sachs and Warner (2001) suggest, the slow-down of economic growth must be an 
indirect effect of natural wealth. Extensive natural wealth reduces economic growth mainly through 
crowding-out growth-promoting activities. Economies that maintain growth-promoting activities may 
be less vulnerable to the natural resource curse. There are a few successful examples of countries that 
benefited or still benefit from their extensive natural wealth. Norway, for instance, converts its rich 
oil reserves mostly in foreign securities and, thus, protects its economy from abrupt income increases 
(Gylfason 2001a). Diamond-rich Botswana experienced high income-growth during the last three 
decades, but it also had one of the highest ratios of government expenditure on education to GDP 
(Gylfason 2001b). 
  In the literature several indirect transmission channels have been identified and investigated 
through which resource-abundance leads to lower economic growth. A rapid increase in income 
levels due to natural resource discoveries may lead to sloth and reduced awareness of the need for 
sound economic management, social equity and institutional quality (Sachs and Warner 1995, 
Gylfason 2000, 2001a). It may also create a false sense of security and weaken the perceived need for 
investments, a high-skilled labor force and growth-promoting strategies. Also, manufacturing 
industries are often harmed by an appreciation of the local currency and a change in the composition 
of exports in favor of resource-intensive goods. Consequently, natural resource abundant economies 
usually experience a drop in manufacturing and other non-primary exports, while these are usually 
characterized by valuable technology spillovers and learning-by-doing (Sachs et al. 1995, 1999a,  
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Gillis et al. 1996, Gylfason 2000, 2001b). Natural resources may crowd-out entrepreneurial activity 
and innovation by encouraging potential innovators to work in the resource sector (through a wage 
premium) and it thus directs funds away from the R&D sector into the primary sector (Sachs and 
Warner 2001). 
  In this paper, we contribute to this strand of the literature studying the natural resource curse and 
its transmission channels on a U.S.-state level. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis 
performed at a regional level focusing on the negative relationship between economic growth and 
resource-abundance and the indirect mechanisms through which this occurs. A merit of our analysis 
is that whereas countries often differ in dimensions – such as language, the quality of institutions and 
cultural characteristics – that are difficult to control for in growth regressions, these differences are 
likely to be smaller across regions within a country (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). The U.S. are a 
relatively homogeneous country, compared to cross-country analyses, and therefore, a regional U.S. 
analysis may provide more precise estimates of the effect of resource wealth on growth and the 
indirect channels through which this takes place. 
  Figure 1 depicts the negative correlation between resource-abundance and economic growth over 
the period 1986-2001 for the 49 states, for which data were available for all the variables of our 
analysis (all U.S. states excluding the District of Columbia and Delaware). The correlation is 
significant at the 1% level. Data are compiled from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. 
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FIGURE 1. Resource-Abundance and economic growth 
 















































FIGURE 2. Absolute Convergence 
 
  Our analysis also contributes to growth theory in a wider perspective, as it estimates the 
conditional convergence hypothesis for different regions (the U.S. states) within a country. Most of  
 
7
the empirical analyses on regional data sets (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992a, 1992b, 1995), Barro 
et al. (1991) and Johnson (2000)) focus on the absolute convergence hypothesis. In these studies, an 
implicit assumption is that different regions within the same country are characterized by the same 
fundamental economic features (tastes, technologies, institutions etc.) and therefore that they all must 
converge to the same steady-state. Then, changes in growth are fully driven by initial income 
differences. Figure 2 depicts the negative correlation between economic growth and initial income for 
our sample of 49 U.S. states, as previously. At a second stage, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) include 
education and immigration as regressors in their analysis, only to show that the convergence rate they 
calculate remains stable. We believe that more can be said about the role of these independent 
variables. Finding the coefficients significant implies that regions converge to different steady-state 
levels, or stated differently, that regions with the same initial income level but different education and 
immigration level will experience different growth rates. Johnson and Takeyama (2001) claim, for 
instance, that the set of U.S. states with a higher density of capital stock experienced stronger 
convergence since 1950. Though differences in human capital, investment rates, resource-abundance, 
openness and institutions across regions are likely to be smaller than those across countries, in our 
analysis we find them to be non-negligible but significant in explaining economic growth.  
  Our analysis on the resource curse transmission channels follows the methodology set out by Mo 
(2000, 2001), who investigates the transmission channels through which income inequality and 
corruption affect growth. Through cross-state regressions (for the United States), we investigate the 
effect of natural resources on investment, schooling, openness, innovation (R&D) and institutional 
quality, and we estimate the share of each transmission channel in the overall negative effect of 
resource-abundance on growth. 
  The next section is devoted to the empirical evidence on resource-abundance and economic 
growth for the U.S. We verify our main proposition that natural resource abundance impedes  
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economic development at a regional level. Section 3 focuses on other growth determinants 
(investment, schooling, openness, innovation and corruption) and the existence of conditional 
convergence. Section 4 studies empirically the transmission channels and compares their relative 
weight in the overall negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. Section 5 analyzes the 
differing growth experience of eight particular U.S. states and attributes their above(below)-average 
growth performance to their resource endowments and other specific characteristics of their 
economies. Section 6 summarizes our main results and offers concluding remarks. 
2. NATURAL RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND GROWTH 
To identify the dependence of growth on natural resource abundance we estimate cross-state growth 
regressions for the U.S. states in the tradition of Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Grier and Tullock 
(1989), Barro (1991) and Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997). We include initial income per capita in our 
regressions to check for the conditional convergence hypothesis that predicts higher growth in 
response to lower starting income per capita keeping the other explanatory variables constant. Thus, 




depends on initial per capita income Y0
i, on natural resource abundance, R
i (the sign of dependence is 
the subject of our analysis) and on a vector of other explanatory variables Z
i: 
G




i,   (1) 
where i corresponds to each single U.S. state.
4  
  We keep in mind that, ultimately, it is not economic growth that determines welfare, but the 
income level, and thus, it is of interest to assess the long-term income effects of a change in a state’s 
resource income R
i, as described by growth equation(1). To estimate the long-term income effect, we 
                                                   
4 Appendix 1 lists all variables and data sources.  
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compare two scenarios. In the first scenario, labelled k, the current value of resource abundance R and 
other regional characteristics Z persist. The other scenario, labelled j, assumes a permanent change in 
characteristics from R
k to R
j and from Z
k to Z







k, respectively. As we show in Appendix 2, a permanent difference in R 
or Z has a long-term effect on expected income given by: 
E(∆ln(Y∞)) = –(α2/α1)∆R – (α3/α1)∆Z, (2) 
where ∆ln(Y∞)= ln(Y∞)
j–ln(Y∞)
k is the long-term log-income effect. 
  Taking exponentials we can rewrite equation (2) and calculate the relative long-term income 
effect as: 
∆Y∞/Y∞ = exp[–(α2 /α1)∆R – (α3 /α1)∆Z]–1 (3) 
For small values of (α2/α1)∆R and (α3/α1)∆Z, we can use the approximation 
∆Y∞/Y∞ ≈ –(α2/α1)∆R – (α3/α1)∆Z. (4) 
The ratio –(α2/α1) captures the long-term income effect of changes in resource endowments. 
Similarly, the ratio –(α3/α1) captures the long-term impact of changes in other explanatory variables. 
Assuming conditional convergence, i.e. α1<0, four different situations may arise. A ratio –(α2/α1)=1 
indicates that an immediate one percent increase in current income based on natural resource 
exploitation (∆R=0.01) also raises the long-term income level by one percent (∆Y∞/Y∞=0.01). An 
income increase brought about by increased resource abundance is permanent. If –(α2/α1)>1 resource 
abundance is so beneficial to growth that a one percent increase in current resource income raises 
long-term income by more than one per cent. If, on the other hand, –(α2/α1)<1, a one per cent increase 
in resource income results in less than one per cent raise in long-term income. The economy benefits  
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from the resource expansion but the permanent income effect falls short of the temporary resource 
income effect. Finally, when α2<0 and α1<0, increased resource rents lead to a short-lived increase in 
income since growth is affected negatively to the extent that, in the long term, permanent income falls 
short of income without the natural resource. The latter case represents a situation known as the 
‘curse of natural resources’. 
  We now estimate growth equation (1) using OLS, gradually increasing the set of variables Z
i.
5 
As a starting point, we estimate growth dependent only on initial income per capita in 1986 (LnY86). 
Data on income levels are provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of 
Commerce, and we use the real Gross State Product (GSP) database, which is the state equivalent to 
GDP. As a second step we include natural-resource abundance, for which we take the share of the 
primary sector’s production (agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining) in GSP in 1986 (Nat) as a 
proxy (values in the range of 0 to 1). The results are listed in column entry (1) and (2) of Table 1. Our 
findings support the hypothesis that poorer regions tend to grow faster than richer regions (a result 
that still holds when conditioning on any other characteristics of the regions).
6 The second column 
                                                   
5 We focus our analysis on the 49 states (all U.S. states excluding the District of Columbia and Delaware), for which 
data are available for all variables of interest. Since there is a lack of data on R&D expenditures for the District of 
Columbia and Delaware, we exclude these states from the first regressions in order to avoid a sample bias when 
comparing coefficients. To check qualitatively our results, we include Table 7 in Appendix 3 that repeats the (first 
five) regressions of Table 1 for the whole sample of 51 states. 
6 For our final sample of 49 regions, we find an estimated convergence rate of 0.022 per year. Our data for the initial 
sample of 51 regions supported a smaller convergence rate, but this is mainly due to the District of Columbia that has 
a GSP per capita twice as high as the average level of the sample. When we include three regional dummy variables 
in the analysis (south, midwest and west) as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), we find a convergence rate of 0.028. 
Both results are close to the absolute convergence rate estimated in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). We do not use 
these geographical variables in our empirical analysis since most of the time they are insignificant and unstable in  
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reveals that there is a highly significant and negative relationship between economic growth and 
natural resources. It is apparent that regions within the U.S. differ substantially in economic features 
that are important for economic growth, apart from initial income levels. A one-percentage point 
increase in income from the primary sector’s production relative to total income decreases growth by 
0.047% per year. An increase in income from natural resources of one standard deviation (0.06) 
decreases the growth rate by about 0.28% per year. This is an effect of substantial magnitude. As a 
comparison, we observe that a one standard deviation increase in initial income decreases growth by 
0.34% per year. When the negative effect of natural resources on growth persists, the long-term effect 
of an increase in natural resource income of one per cent amounts to 4.77/1.77=3 per cent (see 
equation (4)). A persistent one standard deviation increase in natural resource income leads to a 
decrease in long-term income by about 16 per cent. The numbers illustrate the argument that whereas 
in the short term natural resources may increase wealth, in the long term the economy can fall back 
more than it gained. This is consistent with Alaska’s experience. It has vast oil reserves and fishing 
banks, but it is the only region in the U.S. with a negative rate of income growth over the last two 
decades. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
sign when included in Table 1. In the final regression of Table 1, where we account for all the explanatory variables 
captured in the vector Z
i, we estimate, though, a much higher rate of conditional convergence (close to 0.033). In that 
respect, our results contradict Barro and Sala-i-Martin’ analysis, which predicts a common rate of absolute and 
conditional convergence. Furthermore, as expected, the estimated convergence rate for our cross-state analysis is 
larger than the ones estimated at a cross-sectional level for different countries (e.g. Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1992)). At a cross-country level, the absolute convergence rate is usually close to zero and the conditional 
convergence rate close to 0.018. This implies that within a country, it is relative easy for poorer regions to catch up.    
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3. CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE 
We now turn to the possible crowding-out effects of natural resources (Sachs and Warner 2001). Let 
us assume that the vector Z
i in growth equation captures a set of growth-promoting activities. If 
resource abundance  (R
i) crowds-out the activities captured by Z
i, then natural resources will 
indirectly harm economic growth (G
i). In other words, a negative statistical relationship between R
i 
and Z
i may explain the negative correlation between R
i and G
i in the second regression of Table 1. 
Furthermore, when the vector Z
i is sufficiently rich to fully capture most of the indirect negative 
effects of resource abundance on growth, we expect that its inclusion in our regressions would 
eliminate the negative coefficient of resource-abundance on growth. In other words, if resource-
abundance affects growth solely through the intermediate transmission channels captured by the 
vector Z
i, we expect the coefficient of resource-abundance to drop to a value close to zero (α2 ≈ 0). In 
case that either natural resources frustrate economic growth directly or not all intermediate 
transmission channels through which resource abundance affects growth are accounted for, the 
coefficient of resource-abundance is expected to sustain its negative sign. As our next step, we thus 
extend the vector Z
i, by adding progressively variables commonly used to explain growth, such as 
investment, schooling, openness, R&D expenditure and corruption, and we examine the magnitude 
and significance of the resource-abundance coefficient α2.
7 
  In column entry (3), we include the share of industrial machinery production in GDP in 1986 as a 
proxy for investment. Data are provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of 
Commerce. The variable refers to the beginning of the period 1986-2001 in order to avoid 
endogeneity problems. Of those investment measures available, we find industrial machinery 
                                                   
7 Acemoglu et al. (2002) use the same argument to give substance to their claim that income levels around 1500 
(proxied by measurements of urbanization and population density) affected long-term income per capita solely 
through institutions.  
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production most likely to be  favorable to economic growth, rather than constructions for instance.
8 
Investment contributes positively and considerably to growth as expected. An increase in the 
investment level of one standard deviation increases growth by 0.78 x 0.29 = 0.23 per cent. In the 
long term, this leads to a permanent income increase of 13 per cent.
9 The coefficient for natural 
resources becomes smaller and less significant (the significance level falls to 11%). 
  In the subsequent column entry we include as independent variables, the contribution of 
educational services in GDP in 1986 (Schooling), which we consider a proxy for investments in 
human knowledge. Next, we include a proxy for Openness, for which we use the ratio of net 
international migration for the 1990-99 for each state relative to the population of the state in 1990. 
We expect a more open economy to receive more foreigners compared to a closed economy. We 
observe that schooling and openness contribute positively to economic growth as expected, and when 
added as explanatory variables they strongly decrease the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficient for natural resources. In column (5) of Table 1, where we take account of the first three 
transmission channels (investment, schooling and openness), the coefficient of resource-abundance 
has been reduced by a factor seven compared to column entry (2) and has become totally 
insignificant. This suggests that a large part of the resource-curse hypothesis is explained through 
these indirect transmission channels.  
                                                   
8 We also used a measure of financial depth (the percentage of GSP attributed to finance, insurance and real estate) 
as a proxy for investment and verified the robustness of the positive correlation between this measure and growth, 
and the negative correlation between this measure of investment and resource-abundance. A discussion and empirical 
investigation on the relationship between investment and financial depth is given by Gylfason and Zoega (2001). 
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) also make the point that low levels of financial depth slows down capital 
accumulation because of the presence of indivisible projects. 
9 0.78 x (– 0.29) / (–1.69) = 0.13, see equation (4).  
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  Finally, in column entries (6) and (7) we incorporate two more explanatory variables in our 
regression analysis. In column (6) we include the share of R&D expenditure in GSP for 1987 as a 
proxy for innovation and endogenous technological progress.
10 In column (7) we include the number 
of prosecuted corrupted public officials over 1991-2000 per 100000 citizens as a proxy of corruption 
in the economy. Data are provided by the Criminal Division of the United States Department of 
Justice. The coefficients of both variables have the expected sign. Innovation promotes growth and 
corruption inhibits it. R&D is not highly significant, though. But we must keep in mind that spillover 
effects of R&D activities are not likely to be constrained by state boundaries. The coefficients for 
R&D will thus seriously underestimate the country-wide effect on growth. Also, innovation may 
affect growth through some other indirect channels such as investments as well, so that part of its 
positive effect is captured through this coefficient (their direct correlation is significant at the 5% 
level). We observe that the coefficient of resource abundance has approached zero at the last column 
entry and has become almost totally insignificant (94% insignificance level). 
  Overall, the sequence of regressions in Table 1 reveals that adding explanatory variables steadily 
reduces both the magnitude and significance of the coefficient of resource-abundance. This leads to 
two conclusions. First, natural resources are not harmful to growth per se. They tend to frustrate 
economic growth mainly through indirect channels (investment, schooling, openness, innovation and 
corruption). Second, the list of indirect channels is rich enough to capture all indirect effects since the 
remaining coefficient shows a negligible impact of resource-abundance on growth insofar as this is 
not captured through the other variables. 
 
                                                   
10 We additionally checked for the impact of landlockedness on economic growth. We found the coefficient 
insignificant and of the wrong sign (positive).  
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TABLE 1. Growth regressions as in equation (1) 
Dependent variable: 
G1986-2000  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant      21.50     20.44     19.34     20.54     27.43     26.97     27.97 
LnY86  
(0.19) 
   –1.90*** 
  (–3.76) 
   –1.77*** 
 (–3.77) 
   –1.69*** 
  (–3.82) 
   –1.83*** 
 (–4.02) 
   –2.57*** 
 (–3.38) 
   –2.53*** 
 (–4.70) 
   –2.59*** 
 (–4.99) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06)      
   –4.72*** 
 (–3.00) 
   –3.43** 
 (–2.18) 
   –2.66 
 (–1.57) 
   –0.70 
 (–0.40) 
   –0.34 
 (–0.19) 
   –0.14 
 (–0.08) 
Investment 
(0.78)      
     0.29*** 
    (2.60) 
     0.26** 
    (2.20) 
     0.34*** 
    (2.90) 
     0.31** 
    (2.60) 
     0.21* 
    (1.74) 
Schooling 
(0.44)     
     0.27 
    (1.20) 
     0.35 
    (1.61) 
     0.29 
    (1.34) 
     0.34 
    (1.60) 
Openness 
(0.17)    
 
        
     1.43** 
    (2.23) 
     1.17* 
    (1.80) 
     1.28** 
    (2.04) 
R&D 
(0.97)    
 
          
     0.15 
    (1.63) 
     0.10 
    (1.12) 
Corruption 
(1.65)    
 
              
   –  0.11** 
   (–2.08) 
R
2 adjusted     0.22      0.33      0.40       0.41       0.46       0.48       0.52 
N 
 
49  49 49 49 49 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=49 of 
regression (7); t-statistics for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 
5 and 1% level of significance. 
 
4. TRANSMISSION CHANNELS 
In this section we further investigate the transmission channels. Specifically, we estimate the impact 
of resource-abundance on investment, schooling, openness, R&D and corruption, and the indirect 
effect, thereof, on economic growth, and subsequently we calculate the relative importance of each 
transmission channel compared to one another. 
  Before turning to our empirical investigation, we discuss the variables that entered the regression 
analysis and we evaluate their probability to act as a transmission channel. We start with investments.  
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Natural resource wealth decreases the need for savings and investments, since natural resources 
provide a continuous stream of future wealth that makes future welfare seem less dependent on the 
transfer of man-made capital to future periods (Corden 1984, Gylfason and Zoega 2001). 
Additionally, world prices for primary commodities tend to be more volatile than world prices for 
other goods. Therefore, an economy based on primary production will shift relatively often from 
booms to recessions and this creates uncertainty for investors in natural resource economies (Sachs 
and Warner 1999b, Herbertsson et al. 1999). Furthermore, natural resource abundance increases rents 
in the primary sector that cause a reallocation of factors of production from the manufacturing sector 
towards the expanded primary sector. Sachs and Warner (2001) mention the wage premium in the 
primary sector as a factor that signifies such changes. The reallocation and decreased investment 
levels enhance each other. Often, the manufacturing sector is characterized by increasing returns to 
scale and positive externalities. A decrease in scale of the manufacturing sector further decreases the 
productivity and profitability of investments, accelerating the decrease in investments (Sachs and 
Warner 1995, 1999a, Gillis et al. 1996, Gylfason 2000, 2001a). Gylfason and Zoega (2001) analyze 
the rate of optimal saving and the maturity of the financial system in an economy and its negative 
relation to the share of natural resources in national output. 
  As a second transmission channel we consider the role of resource-abundance in explaining 
educational quality. Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega (1999) show empirically an inverse 
relationship across countries between school enrolment rates for all school levels and resource-
abundance. Increases in resource income lead to a contraction of the manufacturing sector for which 
human capital is an important production factor. The need for higher education declines, and so does 
the returns to education (Gylfason 2001a). Due to a higher level of non-wage income, private and 
public incentives to accumulate human capital are reduced (Gylfason and Zoega 2001). It is also 
claimed that natural resource abundance creates a false sense of confidence: “easy riches lead to  
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sloth” (Sachs and Warner 1995). An expanding primary sector does not need a high-skilled labor 
force, and there is no feeling of urgency to increase spending on education. This restricts the future 
expansion of other sectors that require educational quality (Gylfason 2000, 2001a, 2001b, Sachs and 
Warner 1999b) and technological diffusion in the economy (Nelson and Phelps 1966).  
  The third transmission channel we consider is the impact of natural resources on the degree of 
openness in the economy, measured by the ratio of net immigrants during 1986-2000 to the 
population at the beginning of the period. We acknowledge the fact that our proxy of openness is not 
obvious. A better measure might have been the amount of exports and imports in GSP for each 
region, but this measure is not available to us. Economies that are open to trade tend also to be open 
in terms of accepting immigrants: a well-known example is the Netherlands during their Golden Age 
(Rodrik (1997 ch.2) claims that open economies tend to have a more elastic labor demand and 
therefore are more eager to accept immigrants). This theme has been elaborated on in the recent 
pioneering work by Collins et al. (1999), who provide empirical support through panel data analysis 
to a strong complementarity between trade-openness and labor mobility (immigration). 
  Our data show that resource-abundance is indeed negatively correlated with the degree of 
openness for our sample of U.S. regions. The mechanisms that link resource abundance to openness 
must be different for the state level when compared to the country level. At a state level, resource 
abundance cannot lead to a raise in trade tariffs or to import quotas; a relation that is often found in 
cross-country analyses (Auty 1994, Sachs and Warner 1995). There is also no overvaluation of the 
local currency (Sachs and Warner 1995, Torvik 2001, Gylfason 2000, 2001a, 2001b, Rodriguez and 
Sachs 1999). Resource abundance may harm, though, the openness of regional economies within a 
country in a different manner. Resource-dependent sectors often suffer from uncertainty due to the 
high volatility of prices of primary commodities (that tend to follow a negative trend over time, see 
Cashin  et al. 2002). In order to protect regional employees working in these sectors, local  
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governments may transfer funds to their support (or exert pressure to the central government to do 
so). If these funds were utilized more efficiently for alternative purposes, this could create a 
temporary loss of jobs for the regional population (and voters). Local trade unions from the resource-
based sectors may deter the development of an institutional and regulatory environment that fosters 
competition. If resource-abundance is also related to rent-seeking and corruption, as it is often 
mentioned in the literature (Gray and Kaufmann 1998, Ascher 1999, Leite and Weidmann 1999, 
Gylfason 20012), then a climate of shirking and opportunism may increase the potential hazards of 
trade (North 1991). In the literature, people in the coal-rich Appalachia region (Virginia, West 
Virginia and Kentucky) are described as relative antagonistic towards the government and foreigners 
(Santopietro 2002, Hansen 1966). Essentially, the arguments show a similarity between regional and 
national governments that both have an increased incentive to protect the perceived interests of 
domestic people when natural resource income grows. 
  As a next transmission channel we consider the effect of resource-abundance on innovation 
(R&D). This linkage receives less attention in the “Dutch Disease” literature, but our data 
unambiguously point to a link from natural resource abundance to R&D expenditures. Sachs and 
Warner (2001) suggest that resource-abundance may crowd-out entrepreneurial activity and 
innovation by encouraging potential innovators and entrepreneurs to engage in the primary sector. To 
the extent that entrepreneurial talent is limited, the crowding-out effect of innovation can be 
potentially large. Furthermore, as Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) point out, when talented 
individuals start firms, they innovate and foster growth. When they become rent-seekers, they only 
redistribute wealth and reduce economic growth. In countries where rent-seeking activities give 
higher rewards to talent than entrepreneurship, innovation is likely to be crowded-out and the 
economy stagnates.  
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  The last transmission channel we investigate considers the relation between resource-abundance 
and corruption. Natural resources provide an easy way of receiving rents (Krueger 1974) and increase 
the returns to bribing the administration in order to gain access to these resource rents (Gray and 
Kaufmann 1998, Leite and Weidmann 1999, Torvik 2002). Additionally, natural resources are often 
associated with the emergence of politically powerful interest groups that attempt to influence 
politicians prone to corruption in order to adopt policies that may favor particular interests as opposed 
to the general public interest (Mauro 1998). Rent-seeking can breed corruption and cause a distortion 
in the allocation of resources (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). 
  Now we turn to the data. Our basis specification of the dependence of the variables Z
i on resource 
income is given by: 
Z
i = β0 + β1R
i + µ
i,   (5) 
where Z
i, β0, β1, and µ
i are specified for investment, schooling, openness, R&D and corruption. 
Table 2 lists the results for the estimated equation (5). Our results indicate that resource-abundance 
leads to lower investment, schooling, openness, R&D expenditure and higher levels of corruption. All 
coefficients are consistent with the negative correlation between resource-abundance and economic 
performance. The schooling variable has the most significant relation to natural resource abundance 
at the 1% level, and resource-abundance alone accounts for 17% of the variation in educational 
quality across different states. Interestingly, we also find a strongly significant coefficient for R&D 
and natural resources by themselves explain more than 11% of variation in R&D expenditures. On 


















Constant    1.23 0.86 0.22 1.50 2.70 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
  –4.45** 
    (–2.36) 
   –3.32*** 
   (–3.24) 
–0.75* 
    (–1.75) 
    –6.16*** 
    (–2.64) 
       5.96 
      (1.42) 
R
2  adjusted  0.09 0.17 0.04 0.11 0.02 
N 
 
49  49 49 49 49 
Note: t-statistics for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. 
 
   To test the robustness of our results we use an alternative specification for the transmission 
channels by incorporating initial income (ln(Y0
i) in equation (5). The specification describing the 
transmission variables becomes: 
Z




  (6) 
Estimations of equation (6) for all five transmission channels are provided in Appendix 4. Two 
findings stand out. First, the coefficient for initial income is insignificant in all transmission channels 
except for the openness channel, and second, the coefficients for natural resource abundance remain 
almost unchanged. From this, we conclude that income is not a major determinant for most of the 
variables captured by the vector Z
i, and this reduces the probability of endogeneity for the same set of 
variables. It’s more likely that the variables captured in the vector Z
i affect income levels rather than 
the other way round. We choose equation (5) as the basis for our further analysis. 
  Since openness, though, appears to depend on income levels, we test an alternative specification 
adopting a measurement of openness based on 1990 data (Openness90) as an instrument for our index 
of Openness over the whole period. The two measures are strongly correlated at the 95% level and the 
instrumental variable is uncorrelated with the error term ε
i of equation (1). In Appendix 5, we present  
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a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimation of equation (1) including all explanatory variables and 
treating average Openness as endogenous. Panel A reports the 2SLS estimates of the coefficients of 
all growth-determining variables and Panel B gives the corresponding first stages. We find no major 
qualitative differences as compared to our previous results (reported in Table 1) but significance 
drops for most coefficients.  
  As resource-abundance explains part of the variation in investment and other variables, by 
substitution of equation (5) into (1) we can calculate the overall (direct and indirect) impact of natural 
resources on growth: 
G




i,   (7) 
where α2R
i denotes the direct effect of natural resources on growth, α3β1R
i indicates the indirect 
effect of natural resource abundance on growth,
11 and µ
i
 are the residuals of (5). The estimated values 
for the coefficients α1, α2+α3β1, and α3 of equation (7) are listed in column (13) of Table 3. 
Alternatively, we adopt the specification provided by equation (6) for the openness channel (since 
openness is the only variable where initial income appears to be a significant factor) and maintain the 
transmission specification of equation (5) for the remaining variables. Results are provided in column 
(14) of Table 3. Finally, the last column of the table presents estimations when we substitute equation 
(6) into (1), in order to account for the possible impact of initial income on all transmission variables. 
Comparing the results presented in Table 3 reveals that the coefficient of initial income in equation 
(7) is likely to be slightly overestimated, when initial income is excluded as an explanatory factor for 
the various transmission variables. Additionally, the coefficient for natural resources is likely to be 
slightly underestimated, though the difference is small. Qualitatively, the conclusions derived from 
                                                   
11 Note that α3β1 is an inproduct of two vectors of five elements.  
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the second regression in Table 1 on the relative importance of initial income and natural resource 
abundance are consistent with the results of Table 3. 
TABLE 3. Growth regression, taking account of indirect effects as in equation (7) 
Dependent variable: 
G1986-2000  (13) (14) (15) 
Constant 28.66  22.20  20.44 
LnY75 
(0.19) 
    –2.59*** 
            (–4.99) 
    –1.94*** 
            (–4.67) 
    –1.77*** 
            (–4.44) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
             –4.46*** 
            (–3.33) 
             –4.66*** 
            (–3.49) 
             –4.72*** 
            (–3.53) 
Investment (µ1; µ1; σ1) 
(0.74) 
  0.21* 
              (1.74) 
  0.21* 
              (1.74) 
  0.21* 
              (1.74) 
Schooling (µ2; µ2; σ2) 
(0.40) 
0.34 
             (1.60) 
0.34 
             (1.60) 
0.34 
             (1.60) 
Openness (µ3; σ3; σ3) 
(0.17) 
    1.28** 
              (2.04) 
    1.28** 
              (2.04) 
    1.28** 
              (2.04) 








Corruption (µ5; µ5; σ5) 
(1.62) 
 –0.11** 
           (–2.08) 
 –0.11** 
           (–2.08) 
 –0.11** 
           (–2.08) 
      
R
2 adjusted  0.52  0.52  0.52 
N   49 49 49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses; t-statistics for coefficients in 
parentheses. The parentheses next to the variable names represent the sequence of residuals used in 
each regression. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. 
 
  Additionally, we quantify the relative importance of each transmission channel in explaining the 
overall negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. The direct effect is given by α2 and  
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the indirect effect by α3β1, as can be seen from equation (7). Results are listed in Table 4.
12 
Consistent with the drop of the natural resource coefficient in Table 1, the largest part of the ‘resource 
curse’ can be attributed to the indirect channels. 










Natural Resources              –0.14           3% 
Investment           0.21         –4.45          –0.93           21% 
Schooling           0.34         –3.32          –1.13           25% 
Openness           1.28         –0.75          –0.96           22% 
R&D           0.10         –6.16          –0.62           14% 
Corruption         –0.11           5.96          –0.66           15% 
Total              –4.46         100% 
 
  Schooling appears to be the most important transmission channel, accounting for one fourth of 
the negative impact of resource-abundance on growth for the U.S. regions. 
5. SOME EXAMPLES 
Modifying the structural representation of equation (7), can further our understanding of the growth 
experience of particular States. Equation (8) attributes growth differences relative to the average 
growth rate (2.47%) to differences in resource-abundance, investment, schooling and openness (the 











  (8) 
where the i superscript represents a single state, the α superscript represents the average state, µ are 
the residuals of equation (5) (which are basically the part of all explanatory variables Z not explained 
                                                   
12 We also calculate the relative importance of each transmission channel for the alternative transmission 
specifications provided by equation (6). Appendix 6 lists results. As illustrated in Tables 10 and 11, a slightly larger  
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by resource-abundance R) and ε is the error term of equation (7). In this way we can interpret 
relatively high and low growth rates over the 1986-2000 period in terms of each explanatory factor 
and an unexplained residue ε. To put it in other words, we can see whether a high or low growth level 
is due to convergence, due to resource-abundance (including the indirect effect through the 
transmission channels), due to the other explanatory variables (whose influence is captured by the 
vector µ
i) or finally due to some unexplained factors (namely the error term ε
i). 
  Table 5 presents the divergent growth experience of four resource-abundant states. Alaska and 
Louisiana are presented in the first two columns of the table. These two states experienced 
disappointingly low growth rates over the period. The large contribution of the resource-abundant 
factor (third row entries) identifies them as typical examples of the resource-curse. The direct and 
indirect effects of resource abundance on growth explain almost half of the negative growth 
differential for Louisiana, and one quarter of the negative growth differential for Alaska. The last two 
columns of Table 5 present New Mexico and Texas. Both states experienced above-average growth 
rates, despite the presence of an extensive resource base in their economies. Other things equal, New 
Mexico and Texas would have experienced growth rates of –0.25 and –0.19 percent point below the 
average, respectively, due to their resource abundance. New Mexico’s remarkable growth 
performance is attributed mostly to convergence and the R&D sector (apart from the unexplained 
residuals). Texas seems to have benefited from its openness. The two last examples illustrate that the 




                                                                                                                                                                     
role for the openness channel is found when initial income is accounted for in the transmission specifications.   
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TABLE 5. Growth differentials from the average value among U.S. regions (Resource-abundant 
States) 

























          –0.25 
 





















–0.12  –0.29              0.15     0.08 
ε
i (error term)  –0.80  –0.30   0.37     0.07 
        
 
        
 
  In a similar fashion, Table 6 pays attention to the economic performance of four resource-scarce 
regions. The first two columns analyze the growth experience of Rhode Island and South Carolina. In 
these two states, resource-scarcity has gone hand in hand with above-average economic growth 
levels. The absence of an extensive primary sector in these economies seems to have been beneficial. 
For South Carolina, resource-scarcity can explain most of the growth differential from the average 
value and for Rhode Island it can explain more than 60%. Both states have additional features of 
interest that supported their economic growth. Rhode Island’s growth experience has been supported 
by high educational standards. South Carolina’s growth rate can also be attributed to convergence.  
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The following two columns present the somewhat disappointing economic performance of Missouri 
and Ohio. Although both states did not suffer from indirect negative effects of resource abundance, 
the other fundamentals of their economies did not support an above-average growth rate. Missouri’s 
low economic growth is largely attributed to a bad performance in terms of openness and investment. 
Ohio’s unsatisfactory performance can be explained by its relatively low investment and high 
corruption levels. 
TABLE 6. Growth differentials from the average value among U.S. regions (Resource-scarce States) 

























  0.13 
 





















–0.01  –0.07     –0.09    –0.19 
ε
i (error term)   0.07  –0.02   –0.14    0 







 6. CONCLUSIONS 
Recent theoretical work and empirical evidence have demonstrated a strong association between 
natural resource dependence and poor economic performance. The belief of many early development 
economists that resource exploitation would lead to economic prosperity proved unrealistically 
optimistic, given recent economic experiences. Nowadays, resource-abundant countries are among 
the most troubled states around the world; they tend to underinvest in education and infrastructure; 
they suffer from rent-seeking and corruption; they fail to diversify their economies, and neglect the 
necessity to constrain government ineffectiveness; they suffer from crushing poverty and long-term 
stagnation. In short, resource wealth did not enable countries to improve the living standards of their 
citizens. It seems that countries rich in oil reserves, gas, or tropical timber embarked on a different 
development path, which did not lead to sustained economic growth, compared to many nowadays 
rich resource-scarce economies. 
  The natural resource curse, as described above, is typically considered a problem for developing 
countries that spoil their wealth instead of managing it efficiently. In this paper, we show that the 
curse is not restricted to the international arena, but it also holds across regions within the highly 
developed U.S.. We used U.S. state-level data and showed that resource-scarce states have a 
comparative advantage in development compared to resource-abundant states. Many of the economic 
ailments restraining long-term growth in resource-abundant countries are also found across resource-
rich regions.  
  This is an important finding for two reasons. First, it casts doubt on the common hypothesis that 
regions within a country converge to the same steady-state income level. There may be a substantial 
and persistent divergence between regions that deserves its own analysis. Second, it demonstrates that 
even in a relatively homogeneous sample, resource abundance can have a substantial negative impact 
through affecting various economic fundamentals such as investment levels, schooling rates, and  
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openness. A better understanding of the indirect resource-curse mechanisms is essential for adopting 
policy measures that can prevent the negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. The 
natural resource curse is not a problem of countries with weak institutions, but it is a common threat 
to both developing and developed economies. 
  We have various extensions in mind of our analysis. First, we should try to decompose our 
measure of resource abundance into its constituent parts and test whether the results of our analysis 
hold for different classifications and definitions of resource wealth. Auty (2001) points out that 
economic growth across countries after the mid 1970’s is likely to be more negatively correlated with 
resource wealth created by mining rather than farming. Therefore, the distinction of the resource rents 
source may provide valuable information to the causes of the resource curse. Furthermore, the period 
of our investigation is diverse in the following respect. The first half of the period before the mid 90’s 
is characterised by relatively low rates of economic growth. After the mid 70’s there was a 
considerable productivity growth slowdown relative to the post-war average (see e.g. Jorgenson and 
Fraumeni 1992) that lasted approximately till the mid 90’s for the U.S. (Jones 2002). After the mid 
90’s economic growth rates rose substantially and economists often refer to the corresponding period 
as the “New Economy” (Gordon 2000, Nordhaus 2002). Therefore, a further analysis should try to 
investigate the characteristics of different sub-periods within the overall period and the respective 
growth determinants. This would improve our insight on the driving forces of convergence and 




Appendix  1: List of Variables Used in the Regressions 
G  Average annual growth in real GSP (Gross State Product) per person between 
2000-1986,  G=(ln(Y2000/Y1986)/21)x100%. GSP data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce (BEA 2003). 
LnY86  The log of real GSP per capita in 1986 (Chained (1996) U.S. Dollar Prices) 
(Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of 
Commerce) (BEA 2003). 
Nat  The share of the primary sector’s production (agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
mining) in GSP for 1986 (values in the range of 0 to 1)  (Data from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce) (BEA 2003). 
Investment  The share of industrial machinery production in GDP in 1986 (Data from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce) (BEA 2003). 
Schooling  The contribution of educational services in GDP in 1986. Data from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce (BEA 2003). 
Openness  The ratio of net international migration (the difference between migration to an 
area from outside the United States and migration from that area) for the 1990-
99 for each state to the population of the state in 1990. Data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau 2003). 
R&D  The share of R&D expenditure in GSP for 1987. Data provided from the 
Industry, Research and Development System (IRIS) of the National Science 
Foundation (NSF 2003). 
Corruption  The number of prosecuted corrupted public officials over 1991-2000 per 
100000 citizens. Data from the Criminal Division of the United States 
Department of Justice (U.S. Department of Justice 2003).  
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Appendix 2: Long-term Income Effects 
In this appendix, we derive the long-term income effects of equation (2). We assume that economic 
growth G for region i depends on its initial income Y0, resource abundance R, and a vector of other 
explanatory variables Z, as described in equation (1).  Since  G
i  represents income growth over a 
period of T years, we can re-write equation (1) as: 
(ln(YT
i) – ln(Y0




i ,  (9) 
and after rearranging terms, we derive income for state i at the end of the period (year T). 
ln(YT





We use the equation above to calculate the difference in expected income (for that reason the error 
terms are eliminated) between two scenarios labelled k and j. Both scenarios assume the same level of 
initial income, so that we abstract from any convergence impacts on long-term growth 
(∆ln(Y0)=ln(Y0
j)–ln(Y0
k)=0). On the other hand, these two scenarios differ in the level of the 





j). This allows us to focus on income differences generated either by the resource-abundance 
factor or the vector of the other explanatory variables Z: 







k. To assess the long-term effects of R 
and Z on income, we assume ∆R and ∆Z constant over time, and we study propagation of income 
differences over time. After two periods of T years, income differences are equal to:  
E(∆ln(Y2T))  = (α1T+2))(α2T∆R + α3T∆Z).  (12) 
After three periods, we have  
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E(∆ln(Y3T)) = (1+(α1T+1)+ (α1T+1)
2))(α2T∆R + α3T∆Z) .  (13) 
For  t→∞ the first term on the right hand side reduces to  
(1 + (α1T+1) + (α1T+1)
2 + (α1T+1)
3 + …) = 1/(1–(α1T+1)) = –1/(α1T).  (14) 
and equation (2) follows.  
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Appendix 3: Growth Regressions as in Equation (1) for all 51 States 
TABLE 7. Growth regressions as in equation (1) for all 51 states 
Dependent variable: 
G1986-2000  (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Constant      12.47     13.13     11.15     14.77     17.74 
LnY86  
(0.25) 
   –1.00** 
  (–2.50) 
   –1.03*** 
 (–2.85) 
   –0.87** 
  (–2.41) 
   –1.26*** 
 (–3.15) 
   –1.58*** 
 (–3.38) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06)      
   –5.28*** 
 (–3.27) 
   –4.29** 
 (–2.63) 
   –2.93* 
 (–1.70) 
   –1.94 
 (–1.04) 
Investment 
(0.78)      
     0.25** 
    (2.11) 
     0.20* 
    (1.67) 
     0.24* 
    (1.94) 
Schooling 
(0.50)      
     0.43** 
    (2.00) 
     0.48** 
    (2.23) 
Openness 
(0.17)    
 
        
     0.83 
    (1.30) 
R
2 adjusted     0.10      0.25      0.30       0.34       0.35 
N 
 
51 51 51 51 51 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=51; t-




Appendix 4: Transmission Channels with Initial Income as an Additional Explanatory Variable 
 












Constant   3.76       –3.98       –4.82       –5.92         1.90 
LnY75 
(0.19) 
      –0.25 
     (–0.44) 
 0.48 
 (1.61) 
     0.50*** 
      (4.76) 
0.74 
      (1.06) 
       0.08 
      (0.06) 
Natural Resources 
(0.06) 
   –4.42** 
     (–2.29) 
     –3.47*** 
(–3.43) 
     –0.91*** 
     (–2.55) 
      –6.39*** 
     (–2.73) 
       5.93 
      (1.40) 
R
2  adjusted  0.07 0.19 0.34 0.11 0.01 
N 
 
49 49 49 49 49 
Note: t-statistics for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance.  
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Appendix 5: Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimation of Growth Regression (1) 
TABLE 9. 2SLS regression of equation (1) with international migration in 1990 (Openness90) as an 
instrument for average Openness 
Panel A: Dependent variable: G1986-2000  (26) 
Constant   26.10 
LnY86  
(0.19) 








  0.19 















  –0.11** 
           (–2.01) 
R
2 adjusted  0.50 
N  49 
   





       1.04*** 
(29.87) 
R
2 adjusted   0.95 
N  49 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=49 of 
regression (7); t-statistics for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 
5 and 1% level of significance.  
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Appendix 6: Relative Importance of Transmission Channels with Alternative Specifications 
TABLE 10. Relative importance of transmission channels. Specification (6) adopted for the Openness 
Channel and specification (5) for the rest. 
Transmission channels  α3  β1 (γ2 for 
openness) 
Contribution to the 
overall effect (column 
(14) of Table 3)* 
Relative 
Contribution 
Natural Resources      –0.14           3% 
Investment           0.21         –4.45  –0.93           20% 
Schooling           0.34         –3.32  –1.13           24% 
Openness           1.28         –0.91  –1.16           25% 
R&D           0.10         –6.16  –0.62           14% 
Corruption         –0.11           5.96  –0.66           14% 
Total      –4.66         100% 
* The coefficient of resource-abundance after substituting equation (5) for openness and equation (6) 
for the rest of the transmission variables into (1). 
 
TABLE 11. Relative importance of transmission channels. Specification (6) adopted for all 
transmission channels. 
Transmission channels  α3  γ2  
Contribution to the 
overall effect (column 
(15) of Table 3)* 
Relative 
Contribution 
Natural Resources      –0.14           3% 
Investment           0.21         –4.42  –0.93           20% 
Schooling           0.34         –3.47  –1.18           25% 
Openness           1.28         –0.91  –1.16           25% 
R&D           0.10         –6.39  –0.64           13% 
Corruption         –0.11           5.93  –0.65           14% 
Total      –4.72         100% 





Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson Simon, and Robinson, James, A., “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and 
Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.” Quart. J. Econ.  117, 
4:1231-1294, Nov. 2002. 
Acemoglu, Daron, and Zilibotti Fabrizio, “Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, 
Diversification, and Growth.” J. Pol. Econ.. 105, 4:709-751, Aug. 1997. 
Ascher, William. Why Governments Waste Natural Resources: Policy Failures in Developing 
Countries. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1999. 
Auty, Richard M., “Industrial Policy Reform in Six Large Newly Industrializing Countries: The 
Resource Curse Thesis.” World Develop. 22, 1:11-26, Jan. 1994. 
Auty, Richard M. Resource Abundance and Economic Development. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001. 
Barro, Robert J., “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries.” Quart. J. Econ. 106, 2:407-
441, May 1991. 
Barro, Robert J., Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X., Blanchard, Olivier, Jean., and Robert, Hall E., 
“Convergence across States and Regions.” Brook. Pap. on Econ. Activ. 1991, 1:107-182, 1991. 
Barro, Robert J., and Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X., “Convergence.” J. Pol. Econ.. 100, 2:223-251, Apr. 
1992a. 
Barro, Robert J., and Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X., “Regional Growth and Migration: A Japan-United 
States Comparison.” J. Japan. Intern. Econ. 6, 312-346, Dec. 1992b. 
Barro, Robert J., and Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X. Economic Growth. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995.  
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce, 2003. Data on Gross State 
Product (GSP), geography, population, primary sector, investment and educational services. 
Available at http://www.bea.doc.gov. Washington: BEA. 
Cashin, Paul, McDermott, John C., and Scott Alasdair, “Booms and Slumps in World Commodity 
Prices.” J. Dev. Econ. 69, 1:277-296, Oct.2002. 
Collins, William J., O’Rourke, Kervin H., and Williamson, Jeffrey G., “Were Trade and Factor 
Mobility Substitutes in History?” In Faini Riccardo C., de Melo Jaime, and Zimmerman Klaus F., 
Eds., Migration: The Controversies and the Evidence. Ch.2. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999. 
Corden, Max W., “Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and Consolidation.” Oxf. 
Econ. Pap. 36, 3:359-380, Nov. 1984.  
 
37
Foster, Andrew D., and Rosenzweig, Mark R, “Economic Growth and the Rise of Forests.” Quart. J. 
Econ. 118, 2:601-637, May 2003. 
Gillis, Malcom., Perkins, Dwight H., Roemer, Michael, and Snodgrass, Donald R. Economics of 
Development, New York: Norton, 1996. 
Gordon, Robert J., “Does the “New Economy” Measure Up to the Great Inventions of the Past?” J. 
Econ. Persp. 14, 4:49-74, Fall 2000. 
Gray, Cheryl W., and Kaufmann, Daniel, “Corruption and Development.” Finance and Development. 
35, 1:7-10, March 1998. 
Grier, Kevin B., and Tullock Gordon, “An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth, 
1951-80.” J. Monet. Econ. 24, 1:259-276, September 1989. 
Gylfason, Thorvaldur, “Resources, Agriculture, and Economic Growth in Economies in Transition.” 
Kyklos. 53, 4:545-580, 2000. 
Gylfason, Thorvaldur, “Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development.” European 
Econom. Rev. 45, 4-6: 847-859, May 2001a. 
Gylfason, Thorvaldur, “Nature, Power and Growth.” Scot. J. Polit. Economy. 48, 5:558-588., Nov. 
2001b. 
Gylfason, Thorvaldur, Herbertsson, Tryggvi T., and Zoega Gylfi, “A Mixed Blessing: Natural 
Resources and Economic Growth.” Macr. Dyn. 3, 2:204-225, June 1999. 
Gylfason, Thorvaldur and Zoega Gylfi, “Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The Role of 
Investment,” CEPR Discussion Paper No 2743, London: Center for Economic Policy Research, 
March 2001. 
Hansen, Niles, “Some Neglected Factors in American Regional Development Policy: The case of 
Appalachia.” Land Econ. 42, 1:1-9, Feb. 1966. 
Herberttson, Thor T., Skuladottir, Marta, and Zoega, Gylfi, “Three Symptoms and a Cure: A 
Contribution to the Economics of the Dutch Disease.” CEPR Discussion Paper No 2364, London: 
Center for Economic Policy Research, Nov. 1999. 
Jones, Charles I. Introduction to Economic Growth. New York: Norton, 2002. 
Johnson, Paul A., “A Nonparametric Analysis of Income Convergence Across the US States.” Econ. 
Let. 69, 2:219-223, Nov. 2000. 
Johnson, Paul A., and Takeyama, Lisa N., “Initial Conditions and Economic Growth in the US 
States.” European Econ. Rev. 45, 4-6:919-927, May 2001. 
Jorgenson, Dale W., and Fraumeni, Barbara M., “Investment in Education and U.S. Economic 
Growth.” Scand. J. Econ. 94, Supplement: 51-70, Nov. 1992.  
Kormendi, Roger C., and Meguire, Philip G., “Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: Cross-
Country Evidence.” J. Monet. Econ. 16, 2:141-163, Sept. 1985.  
 
38
Krueger, Anne O., “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.” Amer. Econom. Rev. 64, 
3:291-303, June 1974. 
Laroui, Fouad, and Van der Zwaan, Bob C.C., “Environment and Multidisciplinarity: Three 
Examples of Avoidable Confusion.” Int. Asses. 3, 4:360-369. 
Leite, Carlos, and Weidmann, Jens, “Does mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption 
and Economic Growth,” IMF Working Paper No 99/85, Washington, DC: International Monetary 
Fund, July 1999. 
Mauro, Paolo, “Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Agenda for Further Research.” Finance and 
Development. 35, 1:10-14, March 1998. 
Mo, Pak Hung, “Income Inequality and Economic Growth.” Kyklos 53, 3:293-316, 2000. 
Mo, Pak Hung, “Corruption and Economic Growth.” J. Comp. Econ. 29, 1:66-79, March 2001. 
Murphy, Kevin M., Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W., “The Allocation of Talent: Implications 
for growth.” Quart. J. Econ. 106, 2:503-30, May 1991. 
National Science Foundation (NSF), 2003. Industry, Research and Development System (IRIS) of the 
National Science Foundation. Data on R&D expenditure. Available at www.nsf.org. Arlington, 
Virginia: NSF. 
Nelson, Richard R., and Phelps, Edmund S., “Investment in Humans, Technological Diffusion, and 
Economic Growth.” Amer. Econ. Rev., 56, 2:69-75, May 1966. 
Nordhaus, William D., “Productivity Growth and the New Economy.” Brook .Pap. Econ. Act. 2:211-
265, Sept. 2002. 
North Douglas C., “Institutions.” J. Econ. Persp. 5, 1:97-12, Winter 1991. 
Nurkse, Ragnar. Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1953. 
Papyrakis, Elissaios, and Gerlagh Reyer, “The Resource Curse Hypothesis and Its Transmission 
Channels.” J. Comp. Econ. 2004 forthcoming. 
Patten, N. Simon, “The Fundamental Idea of Capital.” Quart. J. Econ. 3, 2:188-203, Jan. 1889. 
Rodriguez, Francisco, and Sachs, Jeffrey D., “Why Do Resource-Abundant Economies Grow More 
Slowly?” J. Econ. Growth. 4, 3:277-303, Sept. 1999. 
Rodrik, Dani. Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics, 1997. 
Rostow, Walt W. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Warner, Andrew M., “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,” 
NBER Working Paper No 5398, Cambridge, Massachusetts, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Dec. 1995.  
 
39
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Warner, Andrew M., “Fundamental Sources of Long-Run Growth.” Amer. 
Econ. Rev., 87, 2:184-188, May 1997. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Warner, Andrew M., “The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth.”, 
J. Dev. Econ. 59, 1:43-76, June 1999. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Warner, Andrew M., “Natural Resource Intensity and Economic Growth.” In 
Mayer Jörg, Chambers Brian, and Ayisha Farooq, Eds., Development Policies in Natural 
Resource Economics, Ch.2. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton Massachusetts: Edward Elgar, 
1999b. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Warner, Andrew M., “Natural Resources and Economic Development: The 
Curse of Natural Resources.” Eur. Econ. Rev. 45, 4-6:827-838, May 2001. 
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X., “I Just Ran Two Million Regressions.” Amer. Econ. Rev. 87, 2:178-183, 
May 1997. 
Santopietro George D., “Analyzing Income Convergence at the County Level: The Case of 
Development in Central Appalachia.” J. Econ. Issues 36, 4:893-904, Dec. 2002. 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W., “Corruption.” Quart. J. Econ. 108, 2:503-30, May 1993. 
Torvik, Ragnar, “Learning by doing and the Dutch disease”. Eur. Econ. Rev. 45, 2:285-306, Feb 
2001. 
Torvik, Ragnar, “Natural Resources, Rent Seeking and Welfare.” J. Dev. Econ., 67, 2:455-470, Apr. 
2002.  
U.S. Census Bureau, 2003. Data on international migration. Available at www.census.org.  
Washington: U.S. Census Bureau. 
U.S. Department of Justice. Criminal Division, 2003. Data on corruption. Available at 
www.usdoj.gov. Washington: U.S. Department of Justice.  
Watkins, Melville H., “A Staple Theory of Economic Growth.” Can. J. Econ. Pol. Sc., 29, 2:142-158,   
May 1963 
.  
NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 






NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2003 
     
PRIV  1.2003  Gabriella CHIESA and Giovanna NICODANO: Privatization and Financial Market Development: Theoretical 
Issues 
PRIV  2.2003  Ibolya SCHINDELE: Theory of Privatization in Eastern Europe: Literature Review 
PRIV  3.2003  Wietze LISE, Claudia KEMFERT and Richard S.J. TOL: Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity 
Market 
CLIM  4.2003  Laura MARSILIANI and Thomas I. RENSTRÖM: Environmental Policy and Capital Movements: The Role of 
Government Commitment 
KNOW  5.2003  Reyer GERLAGH: Induced Technological Change under Technological Competition 
ETA  6.2003  Efrem CASTELNUOVO: Squeezing the Interest Rate Smoothing Weight with a Hybrid Expectations Model 
SIEV  7.2003  Anna ALBERINI, Alberto LONGO, Stefania TONIN, Francesco TROMBETTA and Margherita TURVANI: The 
Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment: 
Evidence from Surveys of Developers 
NRM  8.2003  Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources: A Blessing or a Curse? 
CLIM  9.2003  A. CAPARRÓS, J.-C. PEREAU and T. TAZDAÏT: North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game 
with Asymmetric Information 
KNOW  10.2003  Giorgio BRUNELLO and Daniele CHECCHI: School Quality and Family Background in Italy  
CLIM  11.2003  Efrem CASTELNUOVO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Learning By Doing vs Learning By Researching in a Model of 
Climate Change Policy Analysis 
KNOW  12.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO and Dino PINELLI (eds.): Economic Growth, Innovation, Cultural 
Diversity: What are we all talking about? A critical survey of the state-of-the-art 
KNOW  13.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO, Dino PINELLI and Francesco RULLANI (lix): Bio-Ecological 
Diversity vs. Socio-Economic Diversity. A Comparison of Existing Measures  
KNOW  14.2003  Maddy JANSSENS and Chris STEYAERT (lix): Theories of Diversity within Organisation Studies: Debates and 
Future Trajectories 
KNOW  15.2003  Tuzin BAYCAN LEVENT, Enno MASUREL and Peter NIJKAMP (lix): Diversity in Entrepreneurship: Ethnic and 
Female Roles in Urban Economic Life  
KNOW  16.2003  Alexandra BITUSIKOVA (lix): Post-Communist City on its Way from Grey to Colourful: The Case Study from 
Slovakia 
KNOW  17.2003  Billy E. VAUGHN and Katarina MLEKOV (lix): A Stage Model of Developing an Inclusive Community 




19.2003  Sergio CURRARINI: On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities 
PRIV  20.2003  Giacomo CALZOLARI and Alessandro PAVAN (lx): Monopoly with Resale 
PRIV  21.2003  Claudio MEZZETTI (lx): Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation 
Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition 
PRIV  22.2003  Marco LiCalzi and Alessandro PAVAN (lx): Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-
Price Auctions  
PRIV  23.2003  David ETTINGER (lx): Bidding among Friends and Enemies 
PRIV  24.2003  Hannu VARTIAINEN (lx): Auction Design without Commitment 
PRIV  25.2003  Matti KELOHARJU, Kjell G. NYBORG and Kristian RYDQVIST (lx): Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in 
Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions 
PRIV  26.2003  Christine A. PARLOUR and Uday RAJAN (lx): Rationing in IPOs 
PRIV  27.2003  Kjell G. NYBORG and Ilya A. STREBULAEV (lx): Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes 
PRIV  28.2003  Anders LUNANDER and Jan-Eric NILSSON (lx): Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative 
Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts 
PRIV  29.2003  TangaMcDANIEL and Karsten NEUHOFF (lx): Use of Long-term Auctions for Network Investment  
PRIV  30.2003  Emiel MAASLAND and Sander ONDERSTAL (lx): Auctions with Financial Externalities 
ETA  31.2003  Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive 
Externality NTU-Coalition Games  
KNOW  32.2003  Michele MORETTO: Competition and Irreversible Investments under Uncertainty_  
PRIV  33.2003  Philippe QUIRION: Relative Quotas: Correct Answer to Uncertainty or Case of Regulatory Capture? 
KNOW  34.2003  Giuseppe MEDA, Claudio PIGA and Donald SIEGEL: On the Relationship between R&D and Productivity: A 
Treatment Effect Analysis 
ETA  35.2003  Alessandra DEL BOCA, Marzio GALEOTTI and Paola ROTA: Non-convexities in the Adjustment of Different 
Capital Inputs: A Firm-level Investigation   GG  36.2003  Matthieu GLACHANT: Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats  
PRIV  37.2003  Narjess BOUBAKRI, Jean-Claude COSSET and Omrane GUEDHAMI: Postprivatization Corporate Governance: 
the Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection 
CLIM  38.2003  Rolf GOLOMBEK and Michael HOEL: Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers 
KNOW  39.2003  Slim BEN YOUSSEF: Transboundary Pollution, R&D Spillovers and International Trade 
CTN  40.2003  Carlo CARRARO and Carmen MARCHIORI: Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations 
KNOW  41.2003  Sonia OREFFICE: Abortion and Female Power in the Household: Evidence from Labor Supply 
KNOW  42.2003  Timo GOESCHL and Timothy SWANSON: On Biology and Technology: The Economics of Managing 
Biotechnologies 
ETA  43.2003  Giorgio BUSETTI and Matteo MANERA: STAR-GARCH Models for Stock Market Interactions in the Pacific 
Basin Region, Japan and US  
CLIM  44.2003  Katrin MILLOCK and Céline NAUGES: The French Tax on Air Pollution: Some Preliminary Results on its 
Effectiveness 
PRIV  45.2003  Bernardo BORTOLOTTI and Paolo PINOTTI: The Political Economy of Privatization 
SIEV  46.2003  Elbert DIJKGRAAF and Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: Burn or Bury? A Social Cost Comparison of Final Waste 
Disposal Methods 
ETA  47.2003  Jens HORBACH: Employment and Innovations in the Environmental Sector: Determinants and Econometrical 
Results for Germany 
CLIM  48.2003  Lori SNYDER, Nolan MILLER and Robert STAVINS: The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Technology 
Diffusion: The Case of Chlorine Manufacturing 
CLIM  49.2003  Lori SNYDER, Robert STAVINS and Alexander F. WAGNER: Private Options to Use Public Goods. Exploiting 
Revealed Preferences to Estimate Environmental Benefits 
CTN  50.2003  László Á. KÓCZY and Luc LAUWERS (lxi): The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension 
 
CTN  51.2003  Matthew O. JACKSON (lxi):Allocation Rules for Network Games 
CTN  52.2003  Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH (lxi): Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation 
CTN  53.2003  Fernando VEGA-REDONDO (lxi): Building Up Social Capital in a Changing World: a network approach 
CTN  54.2003  Matthew HAAG and Roger LAGUNOFF (lxi): On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation 
CTN  55.2003  Taiji FURUSAWA and Hideo KONISHI (lxi): Free Trade Networks 
CTN  56.2003  Halis Murat YILDIZ (lxi): National Versus International Mergers and Trade Liberalization 
CTN  57.2003   Santiago RUBIO and Alistair ULPH (lxi): An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International 
Environmental Agreements 
KNOW  58.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Dino PINELLI and Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO: ICT, Clusters and Regional Cohesion: A 
Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Research 
KNOW  59.2003   Giorgio BELLETTINI and Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO: Special Interests and Technological Change 
ETA  60.2003  Ronnie SCHÖB: The Double Dividend Hypothesis of Environmental Taxes: A Survey 
CLIM  61.2003  Michael FINUS, Ekko van IERLAND and Robert DELLINK: Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel 
Formation Game 
GG  62.2003  Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of 
International Environmental Agreements 
SIEV  63.2003  Alberto PETRUCCI: Taxing Land Rent in an Open Economy 
CLIM  64.2003  Joseph E. ALDY, Scott BARRETT and Robert N. STAVINS: Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate 
Policy Architectures 
SIEV  65.2003  Edi DEFRANCESCO: The Beginning of Organic Fish Farming in Italy 
SIEV  66.2003  Klaus CONRAD: Price Competition and Product Differentiation when Consumers Care for the Environment 
SIEV  67.2003  Paulo A.L.D. NUNES, Luca ROSSETTO, Arianne DE BLAEIJ: Monetary Value Assessment of Clam Fishing 
Management Practices in the Venice Lagoon: Results from a Stated Choice Exercise 
CLIM  68.2003  ZhongXiang ZHANG: Open Trade with the U.S. Without Compromising Canada’s Ability to Comply with its 
Kyoto Target  
KNOW  69.2003  David FRANTZ (lix): Lorenzo Market between Diversity and Mutation 
KNOW  70.2003  Ercole SORI (lix): Mapping Diversity in Social History 
KNOW  71.2003  Ljiljana DERU SIMIC (lxii): What is Specific about Art/Cultural Projects? 
KNOW  72.2003  Natalya V. TARANOVA (lxii):The Role of the City in Fostering Intergroup Communication in a Multicultural 
Environment: Saint-Petersburg’s Case  
KNOW  73.2003  Kristine CRANE (lxii): The City as an Arena for the Expression of Multiple Identities in the Age of 
Globalisation and Migration 
KNOW  74.2003  Kazuma MATOBA (lxii): Glocal Dialogue- Transformation through Transcultural Communication 
KNOW  75.2003  Catarina REIS OLIVEIRA (lxii): Immigrants’ Entrepreneurial Opportunities: The Case of the Chinese in 
Portugal 
KNOW  76.2003  Sandra WALLMAN (lxii): The Diversity of Diversity - towards a typology of urban systems 
KNOW  77.2003  Richard PEARCE (lxii): A Biologist’s View of Individual Cultural Identity for the Study of Cities 
KNOW  78.2003  Vincent MERK (lxii): Communication Across Cultures: from Cultural Awareness to Reconciliation of the 
Dilemmas 
KNOW  79.2003  Giorgio BELLETTINI, Carlotta BERTI CERONI and Gianmarco I.P.OTTAVIANO: Child Labor and Resistance 
to Change  
ETA  80.2003  Michele MORETTO, Paolo M. PANTEGHINI and Carlo SCARPA: Investment Size and Firm’s Value under 
Profit Sharing Regulation IEM  81.2003  Alessandro LANZA, Matteo MANERA and Massimo GIOVANNINI: Oil and Product Dynamics in International 
Petroleum Markets 
CLIM  82.2003  Y. Hossein FARZIN and Jinhua ZHAO: Pollution Abatement Investment When Firms Lobby Against 
Environmental Regulation 
CLIM  83.2003  Giuseppe DI VITA: Is the Discount Rate Relevant in Explaining the Environmental Kuznets Curve? 
CLIM  84.2003  Reyer GERLAGH and Wietze LISE: Induced Technological Change Under Carbon Taxes 
NRM  85.2003  Rinaldo BRAU, Alessandro LANZA and Francesco PIGLIARU: How Fast are the Tourism Countries Growing? 
The cross-country evidence 
KNOW  86.2003  Elena BELLINI, Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Dino PINELLI: The ICT Revolution: opportunities and risks 
for the Mezzogiorno 
SIEV  87.2003  Lucas BRETSCGHER and Sjak SMULDERS: Sustainability and Substitution of Exhaustible Natural Resources. 
How resource prices affect long-term R&D investments 
CLIM  88.2003  Johan EYCKMANS and Michael FINUS: New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of 
Global Warming 
CLIM  89.2003  Marzio GALEOTTI: Economic Development and Environmental Protection 
CLIM  90.2003  Marzio GALEOTTI: Environment and Economic Growth: Is Technical Change the Key to Decoupling? 
CLIM  91.2003  Marzio GALEOTTI and Barbara BUCHNER: Climate Policy and Economic Growth in Developing Countries 
IEM  92.2003  A. MARKANDYA, A. GOLUB and E. STRUKOVA: The Influence of Climate Change Considerations on Energy 
Policy: The Case of Russia 
ETA  93.2003  Andrea BELTRATTI: Socially Responsible Investment in General Equilibrium 
CTN  94.2003  Parkash CHANDER: The γ-Core and Coalition Formation  
IEM  95.2003  Matteo MANERA and Angelo MARZULLO: Modelling the Load Curve of Aggregate Electricity Consumption 
Using Principal Components 
IEM  96.2003  Alessandro LANZA, Matteo MANERA, Margherita GRASSO and Massimo GIOVANNINI: Long-run Models of 
Oil Stock Prices 
CTN  97.2003  Steven J. BRAMS, Michael A.  JONES, and D. Marc KILGOUR: Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process 
Matters 
KNOW  98.2003  John CROWLEY, Marie-Cecile NAVES (lxiii): Anti-Racist Policies in France. From Ideological and Historical 
Schemes to Socio-Political Realities 
KNOW  99.2003  Richard THOMPSON FORD (lxiii): Cultural Rights and Civic Virtue  
KNOW  100.2003  Alaknanda PATEL (lxiii): Cultural Diversity and Conflict in Multicultural Cities 
KNOW  101.2003  David MAY (lxiii): The Struggle of Becoming Established in a Deprived Inner-City Neighbourhood 
KNOW  102.2003  Sébastien ARCAND, Danielle JUTEAU, Sirma BILGE, and Francine LEMIRE (lxiii) : Municipal Reform on the 
Island of Montreal: Tensions Between Two Majority Groups in a Multicultural City 
CLIM  103.2003  Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: China and the Evolution of the Present Climate Regime 
CLIM  104.2003  Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in 
International Climate Agreements 
CLIM  105.2003  Anil MARKANDYA and Dirk T.G. RÜBBELKE: Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy 
NRM  106.2003  Anne Sophie CRÉPIN (lxiv): Management Challenges for Multiple-Species Boreal Forests 
NRM  107.2003  Anne Sophie CRÉPIN (lxiv): Threshold Effects in Coral Reef  Fisheries 
SIEV  108.2003  Sara ANIYAR ( lxiv): Estimating the Value of Oil Capital in a Small Open Economy: The Venezuela’s Example 
SIEV  109.2003  Kenneth ARROW, Partha DASGUPTA and Karl-Göran MÄLER(lxiv): Evaluating Projects and Assessing 
Sustainable Development in Imperfect Economies 
NRM  110.2003  Anastasios XEPAPADEAS and Catarina ROSETA-PALMA(lxiv): Instabilities and Robust Control in  Fisheries  
NRM  111.2003  Charles PERRINGS and Brian WALKER (lxiv): Conservation and Optimal Use of Rangelands 
ETA  112.2003  Jack GOODY (lxiv): Globalisation, Population and Ecology 
CTN  113.2003  Carlo CARRARO, Carmen MARCHIORI and Sonia OREFFICE: Endogenous Minimum Participation in 
International Environmental Treaties 
CTN  114.2003  Guillaume HAERINGER and Myrna WOODERS: Decentralized Job Matching 
CTN  115.2003  Hideo KONISHI and M. Utku UNVER: Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems 
CTN  116.2003  Somdeb LAHIRI: Stable Matchings for the Room-Mates Problem 
CTN  117.2003  Somdeb LAHIRI: Stable Matchings for a Generalized Marriage Problem 
CTN  118.2003  Marita LAUKKANEN: Transboundary Fisheries Management under Implementation Uncertainty 
CTN  119.2003  Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary 
Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results 
CTN  120.2003  Gianluigi VERNASCA: Dynamic Price Competition with Price Adjustment Costs and Product Differentiation 
CTN  121.2003  Myrna WOODERS, Edward CARTWRIGHT and Reinhard SELTEN: Social Conformity in Games with Many 
Players 
CTN  122.2003  Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players 
CTN  123.2003  Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many 
Players 
  1000  Carlo CARRARO, Alessandro LANZA and Valeria PAPPONETTI: One Thousand Working Papers  
NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2004 
     
IEM  1.2004  Anil MARKANDYA, Suzette PEDROSO and Alexander GOLUB:  Empirical Analysis of National Income and 
So2 Emissions in Selected European Countries
 
ETA  2.2004  Masahisa FUJITA and Shlomo WEBER: Strategic Immigration Policies and Welfare in Heterogeneous Countries 
PRA  3.2004  Adolfo DI CARLUCCIO, Giovanni FERRI, Cecilia FRALE and Ottavio RICCHI: Do Privatizations Boost 
Household Shareholding? Evidence from Italy 
ETA  4.2004  Victor GINSBURGH and Shlomo WEBER: Languages Disenfranchisement in the European Union 
ETA  5.2004  Romano PIRAS: Growth, Congestion of Public Goods, and Second-Best Optimal Policy 
CCMP  6.2004  Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: Lessons from the Polder: Is Dutch CO2-Taxation Optimal 
PRA  7.2004  Sandro BRUSCO, Giuseppe LOPOMO and S. VISWANATHAN (lxv): Merger Mechanisms 
PRA  8.2004  Wolfgang AUSSENEGG, Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): IPO Pricing with Bookbuilding, and a 
When-Issued Market  
PRA  9.2004  Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): Primary Market Design: Direct Mechanisms and Markets 
PRA  10.2004  Florian ENGLMAIER, Pablo GUILLEN, Loreto LLORENTE, Sander ONDERSTAL and Rupert SAUSGRUBER 
(lxv): The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions 
PRA  11.2004  Bjarne BRENDSTRUP and Harry J. PAARSCH (lxv): Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-
Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders 
PRA  12.2004  Ohad KADAN (lxv): Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliated Private Values  
PRA  13.2004  Maarten C.W. JANSSEN (lxv): Auctions as Coordination Devices 
PRA  14.2004  Gadi FIBICH, Arieh GAVIOUS and Aner SELA (lxv): All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers 
PRA  15.2004  Orly SADE, Charles SCHNITZLEIN and Jaime F. ZENDER (lxv): Competition and Cooperation in Divisible 
Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination 
PRA  16.2004  Marta STRYSZOWSKA (lxv): Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price Internet Auctions 
CCMP  17.2004  Slim Ben YOUSSEF: R&D in Cleaner Technology and International Trade 
NRM  18.2004  Angelo ANTOCI, Simone BORGHESI and Paolo RUSSU (lxvi): Biodiversity and Economic Growth: 
Stabilization Versus Preservation of the Ecological Dynamics 
SIEV  19.2004  Anna ALBERINI, Paolo ROSATO, Alberto LONGO  and Valentina ZANATTA: Information and Willingness to 
Pay in a Contingent Valuation Study: The Value of S. Erasmo in the Lagoon of Venice 
NRM  20.2004  Guido CANDELA and Roberto CELLINI (lxvii): Investment in Tourism Market: A Dynamic Model of  
Differentiated Oligopoly 
NRM  21.2004  Jacqueline M. HAMILTON (lxvii): Climate and the Destination Choice of German Tourists 
NRM  22.2004  Javier Rey-MAQUIEIRA PALMER, Javier LOZANO IBÁÑEZ  and Carlos Mario GÓMEZ GÓMEZ (lxvii): 
Land, Environmental Externalities and Tourism Development 
NRM  23.2004  Pius ODUNGA and Henk FOLMER (lxvii): Profiling Tourists for Balanced Utilization of Tourism-Based 
Resources in Kenya 
NRM  24.2004  Jean-Jacques NOWAK, Mondher SAHLI and Pasquale M. SGRO (lxvii):Tourism, Trade and Domestic Welfare 
NRM  25.2004  Riaz SHAREEF (lxvii): Country Risk Ratings of Small Island Tourism Economies 
NRM  26.2004  Juan Luis EUGENIO-MARTÍN, Noelia MARTÍN MORALES and Riccardo SCARPA (lxvii): Tourism and 
Economic Growth in Latin American Countries: A Panel Data Approach 
NRM  27.2004  Raúl Hernández MARTÍN (lxvii): Impact of Tourism Consumption on GDP. The Role of Imports  
CSRM  28.2004  Nicoletta FERRO: Cross-Country Ethical Dilemmas in Business: A Descriptive Framework 
NRM  29.2004  Marian WEBER (lxvi): Assessing the Effectiveness of Tradable Landuse Rights for Biodiversity Conservation: 
an Application to Canada's Boreal Mixedwood Forest 
NRM  30.2004  Trond BJORNDAL, Phoebe KOUNDOURI and Sean PASCOE (lxvi): Output Substitution in Multi-Species 
Trawl Fisheries: Implications for Quota Setting 
CCMP  31.2004  Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA, Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on 
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part I: Sectoral Analysis of Climate Impacts in Italy 
CCMP  32.2004  Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA ,Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on 
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part II: Individual Perception of Climate Extremes in Italy 
CTN  33.2004  Wilson PEREZ: Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution 
KTHC  34.2004  Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI (lxviii): The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence 
from US Cities 
KTHC  35.2004  Linda CHAIB (lxviii): Immigration and Local Urban Participatory Democracy: A Boston-Paris Comparison 
KTHC  36.2004  Franca ECKERT COEN and Claudio ROSSI  (lxviii): Foreigners, Immigrants, Host Cities: The Policies of 
Multi-Ethnicity in Rome. Reading Governance in a Local Context 
KTHC  37.2004  Kristine CRANE (lxviii): Governing Migration: Immigrant Groups’ Strategies in Three Italian Cities – Rome, 
Naples and Bari 
KTHC  38.2004  Kiflemariam HAMDE (lxviii): Mind in Africa, Body in Europe: The Struggle for Maintaining and Transforming 
Cultural Identity - A Note from the Experience of Eritrean Immigrants in Stockholm 
ETA  39.2004  Alberto CAVALIERE: Price Competition with Information Disparities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly 
PRA  40.2004  Andrea BIGANO and Stef PROOST: The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental 
Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
CCMP  41.2004  Micheal FINUS (lxix): International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems KTHC  42.2004  Francesco CRESPI: Notes on the Determinants of Innovation: A Multi-Perspective Analysis 
CTN  43.2004  Sergio CURRARINI and Marco MARINI: Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies 
CTN  44.2004  Marc ESCRIHUELA-VILLAR: Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability 
NRM  45.2004  Sebastian BERVOETS and Nicolas GRAVEL (lxvi): Appraising Diversity with an Ordinal Notion of Similarity: 
An Axiomatic Approach 
NRM  46.2004  Signe ANTHON and Bo JELLESMARK THORSEN (lxvi):  Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric 
Information on Private Environmental Benefits 
NRM  47.2004  John MBURU (lxvi): Wildlife Conservation and Management in Kenya: Towards a Co-management Approach 
NRM  48.2004  Ekin BIROL, Ágnes GYOVAI  and Melinda SMALE (lxvi): Using a Choice Experiment to Value Agricultural 
Biodiversity on Hungarian Small Farms: Agri-Environmental Policies in a Transition al Economy 
CCMP  49.2004  Gernot KLEPPER and Sonja PETERSON: The EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Allowance Prices, Trade Flows, 
Competitiveness Effects 
GG  50.2004  Scott BARRETT and Michael HOEL: Optimal Disease Eradication 
CTN  51.2004  Dinko DIMITROV, Peter BORM, Ruud HENDRICKX and Shao CHIN SUNG: Simple Priorities and Core 
Stability in Hedonic Games 
SIEV  52.2004  Francesco RICCI: Channels of Transmission of Environmental Policy to Economic Growth: A Survey of the 
Theory 
SIEV  53.2004  Anna ALBERINI, Maureen CROPPER, Alan KRUPNICK and Nathalie B. SIMON: Willingness to Pay for 
Mortality Risk Reductions: Does Latency Matter? 
NRM  54.2004  Ingo BRÄUER and Rainer MARGGRAF (lvxi): Valuation of Ecosystem Services Provided by Biodiversity 
Conservation: An Integrated Hydrological and Economic Model to Value the Enhanced Nitrogen Retention in 
Renaturated Streams 
NRM  55.2004  Timo GOESCHL and  Tun LIN (lxvi): Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and 
Regulatory Choices  
NRM  56.2004  Tom DEDEURWAERDERE (lxvi): Bioprospection: From the Economics of Contracts to Reflexive Governance 
CCMP  57.2004  Katrin REHDANZ  and David MADDISON: The Amenity Value of Climate to German Households 
CCMP  58.2004  Koen SMEKENS and Bob VAN DER ZWAAN: Environmental Externalities of Geological Carbon Sequestration 
Effects on Energy Scenarios 
NRM  59.2004  Valentina BOSETTI, Mariaester CASSINELLI and Alessandro LANZA (lxvii): Using Data Envelopment 
Analysis to Evaluate Environmentally Conscious Tourism Management 
NRM  60.2004  Timo GOESCHL and Danilo CAMARGO IGLIORI (lxvi):Property Rights Conservation and Development: An 
Analysis of Extractive Reserves in the Brazilian Amazon 
CCMP  61.2004  Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a 
Technology-based Climate Protocol 
NRM  62.2004  Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Resource-Abundance and Economic Growth in the U.S.  
 
(lix) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Mapping Diversity”, Leuven, May 16-
17, 2002 
(lx)  This  paper  was  presented  at  the  EuroConference  on  “Auctions  and  Market  Design:  Theory, 
Evidence and Applications”, organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, September 26-
28, 2002 
(lxi) This paper was presented at the Eighth Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network organised by 
the GREQAM, Aix-en-Provence, France, January 24-25, 2003    
(lxii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Communication across Cultures in 
Multicultural Cities”, The Hague, November 7-8, 2002 
(lxiii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Social dynamics and conflicts in 
multicultural cities”, Milan, March 20-21, 2003 
(lxiv) This paper was presented at the International Conference on “Theoretical Topics in Ecological 
Economics”, organised by the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics - ICTP, the 
Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei – FEEM 
Trieste, February 10-21, 2003 
(lxv) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory, 
Evidence and Applications” organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and sponsored by the EU, 
Milan, September 25-27, 2003 
(lxvi)  This  paper  has  been  presented  at  the  4th  BioEcon  Workshop  on  “Economic  Analysis  of 
Policies  for  Biodiversity  Conservation”  organised  on  behalf  of  the  BIOECON  Network  by 
Fondazione  Eni  Enrico  Mattei,  Venice  International  University  (VIU)  and  University  College 
London (UCL) , Venice, August 28-29, 2003 
(lxvii) This paper has been presented at the international conference on “Tourism and Sustainable 
Economic  Development  –  Macro  and  Micro  Economic  Issues”  jointly  organised  by  CRENoS 
(Università di Cagliari e Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, and supported by the 
World Bank, Sardinia, September 19-20, 2003 
(lxviii)  This  paper  was  presented  at  the  ENGIME  Workshop  on  “Governance  and  Policies  in 
Multicultural Cities”, Rome, June 5-6, 2003 
(lxix) This paper was presented at  the Fourth EEP Plenary Workshop and EEP Conference “The 




  2003 SERIES 
  CLIM  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
  GG  Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KNOW  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti) 
  PRIV  Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 




  2004 SERIES 
  CCMP  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
  GG  Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KTHC  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti) 
  PRA  Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  CTN  Coalition Theory Network 
 